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WARRANTS IN THE CLOUDS:
HOW EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT
THREATENS THE UNITED STATES’ CLOUD
STORAGE INDUSTRY
INTRODUCTION
The advancement of technology and the global shift towards cloud data
storage has created major rifts throughout the legal landscape. Cloud
technology has changed the way data is stored by breaking down borders
and expanding jurisdictional reach. Unfortunately, congressional legislation
has failed to keep pace with the rapid changes and extraterritorial nature of
the tech industry.1 The current piece of congressional legislation that
oversees data privacy protection within the United States is the Stored
Communications Act (SCA),2 which was enacted as part of the broader
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986.3 However, the
SCA is now almost three decades old, and its vague application to present
cloud technology and worldwide technological expansion has exposed U.S.
technology companies, which utilize global cloud networks, to compliance
difficulties from judicial and legislative uncertainty.4
A recent dispute between Microsoft and the United States Government
highlighted the disparity between the globalization of data storage,
international privacy rights, and current congressional legislation.5 In what
is described as a potentially “landmark case,”6 the United States District
Court of the Southern District of New York (the district court) upheld a
1. William Jeremy Robinson, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under the
Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1197 (2010) (“The law cannot keep up with the
pace of change in computer networking. By the time legislatures or courts figure out how to deal
with a new product or service, the technology has already progressed.”).
2. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2012).
3. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2712, 3121–3126).
4. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act and A Legislator’s Guide
to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208 (2004). See also Jay P. Kesan et al.,
Information Privacy and Data Control in Cloud Computing: Consumers, Privacy Preferences,
and Market Efficiency, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 341, 401 (2013) (“The status of the SCA is
problematic because much of the language is very unclear or outdated and interpretations of the
statute by courts have varied significantly.”); Illana R. Kattan, Note, Cloudy Privacy Protections:
Why the Stored Communications Act Fails to Protect the Privacy of Communications Stored in the
Cloud, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 617, 645 (2011) (“Because Congress enacted the SCA as
part of ECPA in the late 1980s and has not amended it to address cloud computing, the ECPA—
specifically, the SCA—needs to be revisited.”).
5. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft
Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) [hereinafter In re Warrant I Mag. J.].
6. Ellen Nakashima, Microsoft Fights U.S. Search Warrant for Customer E-mails Held in
Overseas Server, WASH. POST (June 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/microsoft-fights-us-search-warrant-for-customer-e-mails-held-in-overseasserver/2014/06/10/6b8416ae-f0a7-11e3-914c-1fbd0614e2d4_story.html.
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warrant under the SCA7 requiring Microsoft to disclose personal data, in
particular private e-mails of a Microsoft e-mail user, stored on Microsoft
servers in Dublin, Ireland.8 The search warrant relates to an ongoing
narcotics investigation in the United States.9 The warrant was originally
issued by a magistrate judge, who “held that [the] warrant did not violate
[the] presumption against extraterritorial application of the law of the
United States,”10 and was affirmed by a U.S. District Court Judge on
appeal.11
In response to the issuance of the warrant, major U.S.-based tech
companies have been in a frenzy to appeal the decision and argue for new
or amended federal legislation to help prevent potential backlash from the
international community.12 Microsoft and other technology and
telecommunications giants, including Verizon Communications Inc.;
AT&T, Inc.; Apple Inc.; Cisco Systems, Inc.; among others (collectively,
U.S. Technology Companies),13 are afraid that the expansion of a search
warrant’s extraterritorial reach, especially to non-U.S. citizens, would cause
“foreign individuals and businesses [to] flee to their non-U.S.
competitors.”14 Verizon, AT&T, Apple, Cisco Systems, and the privacy
group, Electronic Frontier Foundation, have filed amicus briefs in support
of Microsoft’s opposition to the extraterritorial reach of the warrant.15 These
technology giants are dedicated to global data storage and transfer, serving
clients from around the world.16 Most importantly, these companies, in
particular Microsoft, sell cloud storage to multi-national corporations who
pay Microsoft to keep personal information and communication secured on
their servers. However, after the district court’s decision to uphold the
warrant, the expanding reach of a vague and dated statute further restrains
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a)–(d).
In re Warrant I Mag. J., supra note 5, at 467.
Id.
Id. at 466.
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 69, In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account
Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., No. 13-MJ-2814, 2014 WL 4629624 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 29, 2014) [hereinafter Transcript of July 31 Order]. See also In re Warrant to Search a
Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., No. 13-MJ-2814, 2014 WL
4629624 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2014) [hereinafter In re Warrant II C.J.] (granting a motion to lift the
stay of the Court’s July 31, 2014 order “affirming the April 25, 2014 decision of Magistrate Judge
James C. Francis IV”).
12. Larry Neumeister, The US Government Can Force Microsoft to Turn Over Emails, Even If
They’re Stored Overseas, BUS. INSIDER (July 31, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/judgerules-against-microsoft-us-warrants-ireland-2014-7.
13. See Motley Fool, Microsoft, Apple, and Amazon Unite Against a Common Foe, NASDAQ
(Dec. 17, 2014, 4:31:02 PM), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/microsoft-apple-and-amazon-uniteagainst-a-common-foe-cm424469.
14. Nakashima, supra note 6.
15. Allison Grande, Microsoft Must Cough Up Data Stored Overseas, Judge Rules, LAW360
(July 31, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/562289/microsoft-must-cough-up-data-storedoverseas-judge-rules.
16. See Motley Fool, supra note 13.

2015]

Warrants in the Clouds: The Stored Communications Act

663

Microsoft and other U.S.-Technology Companies that rely on cloud data
networks.17
Microsoft, Verizon, and Cisco are all still reeling from international
damage caused by Edward Snowden’s mass leak of U.S. National Security
Agency (NSA) surveillance programs,18 which exposed the U.S.
government’s widespread infringement of both U.S. and foreign citizens’
privacy through phone wiretaps and internet surveillance.19 The district
courts’ recent affirmation of the SCA warrant against Microsoft, in
allowing the U.S. government to seize private electronic communication
stored abroad without going through the traditional bilateral channels20 to
obtain such evidence, further heightens fears of U.S. privacy intrusion both
at home and aboard. This places a strong burden on U.S. Technology
Companies to interpret unclear and dated congressional legislation and
attempt to construct a coherent and precise compliance policy for their
business to assure certain privacy protections to their customers without
violating domestic or international law.21 Without a clear compliance policy
outlining specific privacy protections for customers’ data stored around the
world on global networks, Microsoft and other U.S. cloud companies risk
losing large sums of business to either foreign data storage companies or
data localization movements in the hopes of sheltering customers from the
expansive jurisdictional reach of the SCA warrant.22
Ultimately, the unclear application of the dated and vague SCA leads to
impractical compliance problems for U.S. Technology Companies, thereby
threatening their economic growth. As long as U.S. legislation lags behind,
U.S. Technology Companies are at risk to losing business with international
17. Id.
18. Nakashima, supra note 6.
19. The extent of the NSA’s surveillance was profoundly troubling due to the discovery that

the NSA specifically targeted foreign officials, particularly in the E.U, for surveillance. See Josh
Levs & Catherine E. Shoichet, Europe Furious, ‘Shocked’ by Report of U.S. Spying, CNN (Jul. 1,
2013, 7:14 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/30/world/europe/eu-nsa/.
20. The traditional bilateral process for requests for evidence located outside the United States
is through Mutual Legal Assistant Treaties (MLAT), which the United States has with Ireland. See
Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ireland
on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Ire., Jan. 18, 2001, T.I.A.S. 13137
[hereinafter U.S.-Ire. MLAT].
21. See generally Jan. P. Levine, Feds Pose Privacy Risk By Grabbing Overseas ISP Emails,
LAW360 (Sept. 8, 2014, 10:27 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/574533/feds-pose-privacyrisk-by-grabbing-overseas-isp-emails (“Left unchanged, Judge Preska’s ruling creates significant
risks for any company subject to U.S. jurisdiction by weakening its ability to protect its
customers’ information, abolishing distinctions between a company’s own business records and its
customers’ private correspondence, and subjecting companies to potential sanctions for violating
privacy laws of the countries in which they locate their data centers.”).
22. See generally Steve Pociask, Spy in the Clouds: How DOJ Actions Could Harm U.S.
Competitiveness Abroad, AM. CONSUMER INST. CTR. FOR CITIZEN RESEARCH (2014),
http://www.theamericanconsumer.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Balkanized-Internet.pdf
(arguing that the Department of Justice’s legal overreach to seize e-mails located in Ireland by use
of warrant will have negative economic implications for U.S. cloud companies operating abroad).
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customers and nations, potentially amounting to lost profits in the billions
of dollars.23 In addition, the extraterritorial application of the SCA places
pressure on international relations, particularly between the United States
and the European Union (the E.U.), over data protection law,24 which only
further constrains the U.S. technology and cloud data industry. Microsoft’s
ongoing legal battle with the U.S. government25 highlights what is likely to
be a recurrent debate over the expanding jurisdictional reach of the United
States with electronic information now commonly stored abroad. Instead of
forcing the courts to interpret congressional legislation, this issue demands
legislators to re-think lagging statutes that relate to electronic information
and to take a more pro-active approach so that legislation more accurately
reflects advances in technology. This Note recommends certain
amendments to the SCA to improve its relevancy to modern technology,
based on the newly introduced Senate bill entitled the Law Enforcement
Access to Data Stored Abroad Act (the LEADS Act).26
Part I of this Article looks generally at the legislative history behind the
formation of the ECPA and SCA statutes alongside the evolution of the
Internet from both a technological and legislative standpoint. Part II
analyzes Magistrate Judge Francis’s order granting the SCA warrant to
obtain private emails located on Microsoft servers in Dublin, Ireland. Part
III looks at the district court’s decision to uphold the SCA warrant against
Microsoft. Part IV looks at the compliance consequences this ruling has on
U.S. Technology Companies, and various aspects the district court’s ruling
has on both Microsoft’s compliance with international law, particularly in
the E.U. Additionally, it discusses Microsoft’s ability (or in-ability) to
create sufficient privacy protections to match customer expectations. Part V
looks specifically at the economic consequences these compliance problems
have on U.S. Technology Companies from a business perspective. Finally,
Part VI looks at the newly introduced bill in the House and Senate entitled
the LEADS Act,27 which has been introduced in direct response to the

23. See id. at 2.
24. John O’Connor, The Microsoft Warrant Case: Not Just an Irish Issue, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 8,

2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2b7ab8cb-f618-47b5-b56f-310b0112772a
(explaining the continued discomfort in the E.U., in particular Germany, with the United States’
stance on data privacy and the global ramifications of the District Court’s decision to uphold the
SCA warrant).
25. See generally In re Warrant I Mag. J., supra note 5; Transcript of July 31 Order, supra
note 11; In re Warrant II C.J., supra note 11.
26. “To amend title 18, United States Code, to safeguard data stored abroad from improper
government access, and for other purposes.” The Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Abroad
Act, S. 2871, 113th Cong. (2014) [hereinafter The LEADS Act].
27. This bill is brought by Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Chris Coons (D-DE), and Dean
Heller (R-NV) “[t]o amend title 18, United States Code, to safeguard data stored abroad from
improper government access, and for other purposes.” Id.
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district court’s approval of the SCA warrant,28 and suggests that further
refinement of the SCA can promote a more efficient legal procedure for
allowing the U.S. government to obtain electronic evidence related to a
criminal proceeding located outside the United States.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ECPA AND SCA
The U.S. government’s alleged power to issue the conflicted warrant
comes from the SCA29 as part of the ECPA.30 In order to understand the
SCA warrant, we must examine the formation of the ECPA and SCA
statutes themselves and consider their relation to traditional federal criminal
procedures and the rise of the Internet in the 1980s.
During the mid-1980’s, Congress had become aware that the various
advancements in technology, including the wireless telephone, home
computer, and internet, were leaving holes in “existing privacy protections
for communications and stored electronic records.”31 Although relatively
few Americans had home computers or used the internet in 1986,
businesses from the mid-1980’s onward began using electronic
communication with increasing frequency.32 In the past, corporate users
connected to a private network via modem to communicate with one
another. Corporate employees would utilize their company’s private server
to send e-mails, post messages on shared “bulletin boards,” or access
company stored information.33 This growing change in communications
concerned policy-makers and civil liberties organizations seeking to remedy
the situation through legislation aimed to protect privacy in electronic
communications.34 As a result, Congress enacted the ECPA in 1986 to
encompass a broad range of telecommunications and electronic
communications privacy rights.35
Structurally, the ECPA was separated into three distinct titles or acts:
the Wiretap Act,36 the Pen Register statute,37 and most importantly for the

28. See In re Warrant I Mag. J., supra note 5, at 477; Transcript of July 31 Order, supra note
11; In re Warrant II C.J., supra note 11.
29. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2012).
30. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2712, 3121–3126.
31. Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical
Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1559
(2004).
32. Id. (noting that much of the expansion in the mid-1980s of businesses' use of e-mail was
from a leveraged move by AT&T to enter the electronic mail market, which was expected to grow
exponentially over a few years) (citing Melissa Calvo & Jim Forbes, AT&T’s E-Mail Enters Slow
Market, INFOWORLD, Mar. 10, 1986, at 5).
33. Robinson, supra note 1, at 1198.
34. Mulligan, supra note 31, at 1561.
35. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2712, 3121–3126.
36. See id. §§ 2511–2522.
37. See id. §§ 3121–3127.
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purpose of this note, the SCA.38 The SCA originated to alleviate Fourth
Amendment concerns arising from the creation of the Internet.39 The
Internet’s expansion into everyday life left a legislative void for the
constitutional protection over searches and seizures of “virtual homes”
created in cyberspace.40 The Fourth Amendment gives privacy protection to
“homes in the physical world”; however, “virtual homes” of the Internet
were left unguarded to government intrusion and privacy violation.41 In
criminal procedure under the protection of the Fourth Amendment, “absent
special circumstances, the government must first obtain a search warrant
based on probable cause before searching a home for evidence of crime.”42
The SCA attempted to provide the necessary privacy protection of
information stored on the Internet.43 As the Internet came to dominate our
everyday lives, “our most private information ends up being sent to private
third parties and held far away on remote network servers.”44
When the ECPA was first enacted in 1986, it was hailed “as a victory
for privacy,”45 despite that personal computers were a rarity and the Internet
was predominately used only commercially.46 Still, even in the mid-1980’s,
there was a growing consensus in Congress that existing privacy laws were
incapable of handling the budding technological advances of the time.47
Although once considered a landmark piece of legislation, today there is a
consensus among members of Congress,48 technology giants,49 and industry
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id. §§ 2701–2711; Mulligan, supra note 31, at 1565.
Kerr, supra note 4, at 1210.
Id.
Id. at 1209.
Id. (“At the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. With few exceptions, the
question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be
answered no.” Id. at 1209 n.8 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001))).
43. Id. at 1210.
44. Id. at 1209–10. This expansion of personal data stored globally by third parties creates
incredible strains on the ability of the Fourth Amendment to protect our personal information. Id.
at 1210 (“This feature of the Internet’s network architecture has profound consequences for how
the Fourth Amendment protects Internet communications—or perhaps more accurately, how the
Fourth Amendment may not protect such communications at all.”).
45. Mulligan, supra note 31, at 1557 (citing 132 CONG. REC. H4045-46 (daily ed. June 23,
1986) (statement of Rep. Kasternmeier) (noting that “broad bipartisan support” in conjunction
with a “coalition of business, Government and civil liberties groups” brought the bill to fruition)).
46. Id. (“In 1986, relatively few people had Internet access; commercial electronic mail
services and commercial data processing center were emerging, but both primarily served the
business community.”).
47. Id. at 1559 (according to Professor Mulligan, “members of Congress, the
telecommunications and computing industry, and civil libertarians,” were aware “that advances in
telecommunications, such as wireless telephones and e-mail, were outpacing existing privacy
protections for communications and stored electronic records”).
48. Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Chris Coons (D-DE), and Dean Heller (R-NV) recently
reintroduced the LEADS Act to the Senate floor. See Senator Coons Reintroduces Bill to Protect
Americans’ Electronic Data Stored Abroad, U.S. SEN. CHRISTOPHER COONS OF DE. (Feb. 12,
2015), http://www.coons.senate.gov/newsroom/releases/release/senator-coons-reintroduces-bill-

2015]

Warrants in the Clouds: The Stored Communications Act

667

professionals that the legislation is now dated in comparison to the farreaching advancements in technology.50
The SCA is no longer relevant given the exponential increase of
Internet usage in the United States in recent years. The SCA originated
from a time far different from today’s global network.51 It is now almost
impossible to go through life without constantly interacting with the
Internet. Even in 2004, before cloud technology further expanded the ability
of companies to store electronic information, there was already “an
enormous growth in personal use of the Internet.”52 Most recently, in 2014,
statistical evidence shows roughly 87% of Americans used the Internet in
comparison to the 66% of Americans that used the Internet in 2005.53 The
results are even more dramatic when compared to the only 14% of
Americans that used the Internet as recent as 1995.54 The Internet is only
going to continue to grow as a prominent part of everyday life for
Americans and people around the world.

to-protect-americans-electronic-data-stored-abroad. Additionally, Representatives Tom Marino
(R-PA) and Suzan DelBene (D-WA) recently introduced the LEADS Act to the House of
Representatives. See Emily Field, House Reps. Propose Bill On Overseas Data Storage, LAW360
(Feb. 27, 2015, 5:03 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/626089/house-reps-propose-bill-onoverseas-data-storage.
49. See Andrew Keshner, Microsoft Loses Bid to Quash U.S. Warrant, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 1,
2014), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202665397289/Microsoft-Loses-Bid-to-QuashUS-Warrant?slreturn=20141120170027 (“Technology giants like Apple, Cisco Systems, Verizon
and AT&T filed amicus briefs supporting Microsoft.”). See also Chris Versace, Opinion: LEADS
BUS.
(Feb.
23,
2015),
Act
Can
Save
U.S.
Innovation,
FOX
http://www.foxbusiness.com/technology/2015/02/23/opinion-leads-act-can-save-us-innovation/
(“The response from technology companies and associations such as Apple (AAPL), IBM (IBM),
Cisco Systems, Internet Infrastructure Coalition (i2 Coalition) . . . has been one of positive support
for the LEADS Act.”).
50. Mulligan, supra note 31, at 1559 (“The changed ways in which people use the Internet,
enabled by new technical standards, laws, and business models, have exposed fundamental
weaknesses in the structure of the ECPA. Many who supported the statute would agree that it has
failed to keep pace with changes in and on the Internet and therefore no longer provides
appropriate privacy protections. It is time to revisit and revise ECPA to establish appropriate
privacy protections that respect individuals’ expectations and constitutional requirements.”). This
statement from Professor Mulligan is even more telling today, because within the past decade
cloud technology has further expanded the gap between the ECPA’s relevance and the technology
it presumably protects.
51. See generally Robinson, supra note 1, at 1196–97 (“The Stored Communications Act
(SCA) . . . is the primary federal source of online privacy protections, but it is more than twenty
years old. Despite the rapid evolution of computer and networking technology since the SCA’s
adoption, its language has remained surprisingly static. The resulting task of adapting the Act’s
language to modern technology has fallen largely upon the courts.”).
52. Mulligan, supra note 31, at 1557–58 (describing how millions of individuals use the
Internet in a multitude of ways as part of everyday life, including e-mails, online chats, photo
albums, journals, blogs, etc., and how that information is stored on commercial servers).
53. See SUSANNAH FOX & LEE RAINIE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE WEB AT 25 IN THE U.S. 17
(2014), available at http://www.pewInternet.org/files/2014/02/PIP_25th-anniversary-of-theWeb_0227141.pdf.
54. Id.
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II. MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S SCA WARRANT APPROVAL
FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
The rise of an electronic medium that disregards geographical boundaries
throws the law into disarray by creating entirely new phenomena that need
to become the subject of clear legal rules but that cannot be governed,
satisfactorily, by any current territorially based sovereign.55

This ominous and foretelling depiction of the divergence between law
and technology is the specially chosen opening remarks of Magistrate Judge
James C. Francis IV, who was presented with the task of applying old
legislation to modern technology.56 On December 4, 2013, U.S. government
authorities, in connection with an ongoing narcotics investigation within the
United States, secured a search warrant from Magistrate Judge Francis
pursuant to the SCA57 for the contents of a Microsoft customer’s private email account.58 Specifically, the SCA warrant required Microsoft to
disclose:
a) the contents of all e-mails stored in the specified user’s account,
including those sent;
b) all records or other information regarding the identification of the
user of the account (such as name, address, phone number etc.);
c) all records or information stored on account including address
books, contact lists, pictures, and files; and finally
d) all records of communication between the user and Microsoft
Network (MSN).59
Once Microsoft realized that the user data associated with the requested
Microsoft account was not stored on servers domestically within the United
States but on servers located in Ireland, Microsoft filed a motion to quash
the warrant.60 Essentially, Microsoft challenged the extraterritorial
application of the SCA warrant. Microsoft stated it was not within the U.S.
government’s authority to issue the search and seizure of information or
documents from a foreign country without going through the proper
criminal procedural channels in place for retrieving documents located
abroad.61
55. In re Warrant I Mag. J., supra note 5, at 467 (citing David R. Johnson & David Post, Law
and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1375 (1996)).
56. Id.
57. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a)–(d) (2012).
58. Joseph Falcone, US Federal Court Orders Microsoft to Produce E-mail Contents Stored
Outside the United States, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS DISP. RESOL. (Aug. 5, 2014),
http://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/-/media/Files/ebulletins/2014/20140805%20-%20ny%20ebulletin%20microsoft%20decision.html; In re Warrant I Mag. J., supra note 5, at 467–68.
59. In re Warrant I Mag. J., supra note 5, at 468.
60. Id.
61. This is referencing the MLAT, which is an agreement between nations (such as the one in
existence between the United States and the Republic of Ireland) in which the countries agree to
assist one another in criminal investigations, including the retrieval of documents for evidentiary
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The court ultimately denied Microsoft’s motion to vacate and upheld
the issuance of the warrant.62 The court was more concerned with the
process of how the SCA warrant worked in obtaining electronic information
than with the actual location of the information. As the court explains, the
SCA warrant is “hybrid: part search warrant and part subpoena.”63 In order
to first obtain the warrant order, “the Government must provide the court
with ‘specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the content of a wire or electronic communication,
or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation.’”64 In other words, to obtain the SCA
warrant, the Government must follow traditional criminal warrant
procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and
demonstrate probable cause to a magistrate judge.65 Once the Government
has made a sufficient showing of probable cause or reasonable suspicion to
a neutral magistrate judge, the Government can “compel a service provider
to disclose everything that would be produced in response to a section
2703(d) order or a subpoena as well as unopened e-mails stored by the
provider for less than 180 days.”66
However, what makes the SCA warrant a “hybrid order” is that unlike a
traditional warrant which requires U.S. government agents to physically
enter the premises and seize the authorized documents,67 the SCA order is
“executed like a subpoena in that it is served on the ISP [Internet Service
Provider] in possession of the information and does not involve government
agents entering the premises of the ISP to search its servers and seize the email account in question.”68 The nature of the warrant applying to electronic
data information allows the performance of the warrant and the seizure of
the data to be completed at any remote location from a certified computer.
Therefore, U.S. government agents would not have to travel to Ireland and
infiltrate the Microsoft server base to seize the e-mails associated with the
purposes. See U.S.-Ire. MLAT, supra note 20. The current MLAT procedure, however, as argued
by the United States and stated by Magistrate Judge Francis, is “slow and laborious, as it requires
the cooperation of two governments and one of those governments may not prioritize the case as
highly as the other.” In re Warrant I Mag. J., supra note 5, at 474 (citing Orin S. Kerr, The Next
Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PENN. L. REV. 373, 409 (2014)).
62. In re Warrant I Mag. J., supra note 5, at 477.
63. Id. at 471.
64. Id. at 469 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)).
65. Id. at 470 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1) (requiring
probable cause for warrants).
66. In re Warrant I Mag. J., supra note 5, at 470. In particular, an order under § 2703(d)
entitles the Government to “all information subject to production under a subpoena and also
‘record[s] or other information pertaining to a subscriber [] or customer,’ such as historical logs
showing the e-mail addresses with which the customer had communicated.” Id. at 469 (citing 18
U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)).
67. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (statute for traditional criminal warrant procedures in the United
States).
68. In re Warrant I Mag. J., supra note 5, at 471.
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suspected user. Instead, they could use any Microsoft computer within the
United States, so long as the computer has the proper user information and
e-mail retrieval software to view the pertinent stored information.69
According to the court, “this unique structure supports the Government’s
view that the SCA does not implicate principles of extraterritoriality.”70
In continuance with the notion that SCA § 2703 is a “hybrid warrant,”
the court shifted its focus from the requirement to show “probable cause”
akin to warrant procedures71 to the principles and procedures for obtaining a
subpoena, which requires the production of information within a party’s
“possession, custody, or control regardless of the location of that
information.”72 The appropriate test for document production, according to
the court, therefore, is not one of location, but is instead one of control.73
The court found that it did not matter where the data for the e-mails was
located so long as Microsoft had control or possession over them.74
Moreover, the court found in terms of a “search and seizure” in the digital
age, the search occurs when a person views the information on a computer
screen (such as viewing the e-mail as you normally would on a computer),
rather than the search occurring at the server location (i.e., the physical
location of the server).75
Another prominent issue of contention was whether Congress intended
for the SCA warrant to reach or apply extraterritorially.76 When Congress
69. Id. at 468 (stating that Microsoft’s Global Criminal Compliance (GCC) team members can
use “a database program or ‘tool’ to collect the data” stored in Dublin, Ireland by initially using
the “tool” to locate where the target account is stored and then to collect the information or data
associated with that account remotely from the server, wherever it is located).
70. Id. at 472.
71. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
72. In re Warrant I Mag. J., supra note 5, at 472.
73. Id. (“Neither may the witness resist the production of documents on the ground that the
documents are located abroad. The test for production of documents is control, not location.”
(quoting Matter of Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 1983))).
74. Magistrate Judge Francis does not go into much depth detailing the court’s definition of
“control” in this opinion. Instead, as explained later in this Note, Chief Judge Preska explores in
more detail Microsoft's “control” in this instance, associating it with the Bank of Nova Scotia
doctrine. See Levine, supra note 21; Transcript of July 31 Order, supra note 11.
75. “[A] search occurs when information from or about the data is exposed to possible human
observation, such as when it appears on a screen, rather than when it is copied by the hard drive or
processed by the computer.” In re Warrant I Mag. J., supra note 5, at 472 (quoting Orin S. Kerr,
Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HAR. L. REV. 531, 551 (2005)).
76. Id. at 470–74. The court goes on to quote the Senate:
The Committee also recognizes that computers are used extensively today for the
processing and storage of information. With the advent of computerized recordkeeping
systems, Americans have lost the ability to lock away a great deal of personal and
business information. For example, physicians and hospitals maintain medical files in
offsite data banks, business of all sizes transmit their records to remote computers to
obtain sophisticated data processing services . . . . [B]ecause it is subject to control by a
third party computer operator, the information may be subject to no constitutional
privacy protection.
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enacted the SCA as part of the ECPA, it did not expressly cover the issue of
its extraterritorial application.77 However, even though the Senate report
“did not address the specific issue of extraterritoriality,” the court felt there
“reflected an understanding that information was being maintained remotely
by third-party entities.”78 Microsoft argued that the U.S. Supreme Court
previously held that a presumption against extraterritoriality exists when
Congress has not given “clear indication of an extraterritorial application”
within the language of the statute or explicitly noted otherwise.79 However,
the court rejected Microsoft’s argument. The court stated that the existence
of “the nationality principle,” which recognizes that American criminal
laws can apply outside the United States to legal entities subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, may require U.S. companies, such as
Microsoft, to obtain evidence located aboard in connection with an ongoing
domestic criminal investigation.80
To help its argument on the ambiguity of Congress’s extraterritorial
intent for the SCA, the court used other pieces of Congressional legislation
to fill in the holes left by Congress within the SCA statute itself.81 The court
looked to the legislative history of the Uniting and Strengthening America
By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001 (the Patriot Act) for guidance and found that Section
108 of the Patriot Act allows “nationwide service of search warrants for
electronic evidence.”82 Specifically, the House Committee stated the
incredible time sensitivity of suspected terrorist’s criminal proceedings
Id. at 472–73 (citing S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986)).
77. Id. at 472.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 475 (“The presumption against territorial application provides that ‘when a statute
gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none,’ Morrison v. National
Australian Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2878, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010), and
reflect the ‘presumption that United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world,’
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454, 127 S.Ct. 1746, 167 L.Ed.2d 737 (2007).”).
80. Id. at 476. The court rationalizes this statement by claiming that the SCA warrant does not
criminalize any conduct outside the United States and does not initiate the deployment of United
States law enforcement agents abroad, but instead only extends “American criminal law outside
the nation’s borders.” Id. The court quotes Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932)
(requiring the return of a sanctioned witness after their refusal to return from abroad to testify in a
US criminal proceeding) in support of the ‘nationality principle,’ stating:
With respect to such an exercise of authority, there is no question of international law,
but solely of the purport of the municipal law which establishes the duty of the citizen
in relation to his own government. While the legislation of the Congress, unless the
contrary intent appears, is construed to apply only within he territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, the question of its application, so far as citizens of the United States
are concerned, is one of construction, not of legislative power.
Id.

81. In re Warrant I Mag. J., supra note 5, at 472–74.
82. This “nationwide service of search warrants” is different from the traditional approach

contained in FED. R. CRIM. P. 41, which requires the warrant to be obtained “within the district”
where the property is located. Id. at 473.
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rationalized the expansion of national search warrants.83 The House
Committee was focused on the potentially devastating “investigative delays
caused by the cross-jurisdictional nature of the Internet.”84 The Patriot Act
allows a warrant under § 2703 to reach throughout the United States, so
long as the ISP was located within the United States.85 Therefore, it does
not matter where the actual server that stored the electronic information (emails, etc.) was located.86 The court interpreted the focus on the location of
the ISP as opposed to the location of the actual server as evidence that
Congress had “anticipated that an ISP located in the United States would be
obligated to respond to a warrant issued pursuant to section 2703(a) by
producing information within its control, regardless of where that
information was stored.”87 Based on the courts’ interpretation of
congressional legislative history, the court ultimately upheld the SCA
warrant forcing Microsoft to disclose the e-mails located in Dublin, Ireland.

III. U.S. DISTRICT COURT UPHOLDS MAGISTRATE
JUDGE’S EXTRATERRITORIAL WARRANT
After Microsoft appealed to Federal Court, Chief U.S. District Court Judge
Loretta A. Preska in a July 31, 2014 hearing, ruled from the bench and
dismissed Microsoft’s motion to quash the SCA warrant, upholding the
Magistrate Judge’s warrant.88 The district court decided that the dispute
came down to a “question of control, not a question of location.”89 So long
as Microsoft had control over the user’s e-mails and was able to access
them within the United States, the court found no reason why Microsoft
should be precluded from disclosing the e-mails in connection with a
domestic criminal investigation. The fact that the e-mails’ data happened to
be stored abroad on servers located in Ireland did not diminish Microsoft’s
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. (citing H.R. REP. 107-236(I), at 58 (2001)).
Id.
Id.
Id.at 473–74 (citing H.R. REP. 107-236(I), at 58 (2001)).
Id. at 474.
Keshner, supra note 49.
Transcript of July 31 Order, supra note 11, at 69. Chief Judge Preska refers to Magistrate
Judge Francis’s statement:
[I]t has long been the law that subpoena requires the recipient to produce information in
its possession, custody, or control regardless of the location of that information. See
Matter of Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663, 667 (2d Cir.1983) (‘Neither may the
witness resist the production of documents on the ground that the documents are
located abroad. The test for production of documents is control, not location.’ (citations
omitted)); Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 147–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(‘If the party subpoenaed has the practical ability to obtain the documents, the actual
physical location of the documents—even if overseas—is immaterial.’); In re NTL, Inc.
Securities Litigation, 244 F.R.D. 179, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); United Sates v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 584 F.Supp. 1080, 1085 (S.D.N.Y.1984).
In re Warrant I Mag. J., supra note 5, at 472.
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control nor inhibit domestic access to the electronic information.90To better
understand the economic and policy consequences the district court’s
decision has on U.S. Technology Companies, Part III of this Note takes an
in-depth look at the various arguments between the U.S. Government and
Microsoft, resulting in the court’s decision to uphold the SCA warrant.

A. THE BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA DOCTRINE AND ISSUE OF
“CONTROL”
The district court used a 1984 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit case, In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Bank of Nova Scotia), to
support its decision to uphold the SCA warrant.91 The Bank of Nova Scotia
case “permitted the disclosure of records stored in the Bahamas and
maintained by a Canadian bank with U.S. branches,”92 and is known as “the
Bank of Nova Scotia Doctrine” (the BNS doctrine).93 Under the BNS
doctrine, “a grand jury subpoena can be used to compel a company subject
to U.S. jurisdiction to produce evidence stored outside the United States if
the evidence is within the company’s possession, custody, or control.”94
Although the documents ordered for disclosure in Bank of Nova Scotia were
banking records of U.S. citizens as opposed to third-party private e-mails of
a citizen whose country of origin has not yet been disclosed,95 the court held
that the BNS doctrine still applied to Microsoft in this case to force
disclosure.96
Microsoft argued that this discrepancy in the types of documents forced
to be disclosed made the present Microsoft motion distinct from the Bank of
Nova Scotia case and doctrine.97 Microsoft argued there was “‘a world of
difference,’ between a bank being compelled to turn over its own records
and Microsoft’s being compelled to produce a customer’s e-mail
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Keshner, supra note 49.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Bank of Nova Scotia), 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984).
Keshner, supra note 49.
Levine, supra note 21.
Id.
The BNS court applied a “balancing interests” test to compare the interests of the U.S.
government to pursue their criminal investigation and the interests of American citizens to have
their bank records remain private. The court found that the interests of the U.S. government in
pursuing a criminal investigation outweighed those of an individual’s right to privacy. Bank of
Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d at 828 (“The interest of American citizens in the privacy of their bank
records is substantially reduced when balanced against the interests of their own government
engaged in a criminal investigation since they are required to report those transactions to the
United States pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 1121 and 31 C.F.R. § 103.24 (1979). United States v.
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 732 and n. 4, 100S.Ct. 2439, 2444 and n. 4, 65 L.Ed. 2d 468 (1980).”).
96. It could be argued that the requirement for the Bank of Nova Scotia to report the relevant
bank transactions to the U.S. government is distinguishable from the private emails of third party
customers to Microsoft, who have no such requirement to report.
97. Keshner, supra note 49. See also Falcone, supra note 58 (“[P]er Microsoft, the actual
content of these e-mails were not company records, but were private information of its customer
and thus entitled to heightened constitutional protection.”).
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correspondence.”98 They claimed these private and personal e-mails stored
on Microsoft servers limited the BNS doctrine’s application because the
documents were contained in a “digital lockbox,” where customers had a
certain expectation of privacy.99 Microsoft said that these private
conversations were distinguishable from the transactional banking records
of the Bank of Nova Scotia and therefore, were not under the same “control”
standard as established under the BNS doctrine.100
The U.S. government countered by dismissing Microsoft’s asserted
limitations to the BNS doctrine. They reiterated that “control” was all that
mattered. According to the U.S. government, the BNS doctrine of “control”
was satisfied because Microsoft could transfer, view, and supply the
contentious e-mails to the U.S. government.101 In the end, the court
concluded that Microsoft had waived its right to argue that the documents
were not their own business records, but rather the documents of its
customers in order to distinguish this case from the BNS doctrine.102 With
the arguments waived, the court found the private e-mails were under
Microsoft’s “control” and therefore followed the Magistrate Judge’s
conclusion that it was a matter of control, not location in demanding
disclosure under the SCA.103
B. CONGRESSIONAL INTERPRETATION OF BNS AND
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF SCA
In determining whether Congress intended for the SCA to apply
extraterritorially, the court found there was sufficient evidence to infer that
98.
99.
100.
101.

Keshner, supra note 49.
Levine, supra note 21.
Id.
Serrin Andrew Turner, the Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y. who represented the
U.S. government, stated, “they [Microsoft] have control of the evidence, that’s what matters.”
Keshner, supra note 49.
102. Transcript of July 31 Order, supra note 11, at 69 (“In my view, also, the argument that the
documents are not Microsoft’s documents but the documents of its customers has been waived
because it was not argued below.”). By “below,” Chief Judge Preska refers to the fact that
Microsoft did not bring up this argument in their briefs to Magistrate Judge Francis and therefore
cannot attempt to argue such points for the first time on appeal to the District Court, based on
FED. R. CRIM. P. 59. Levine, supra note 21 (citing JOHN K. RABIEJ, 28 MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 659.11 (2014)). Levine makes the argument that the district
court misapplied the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, finding that Microsoft should have had
the right to object to the Magistrate Judge’s order with “sufficient specificity so as reasonable to
alert the district court of the true grounds of its objections.” Id. Whether or not Microsoft could
make such an argument to highlight the discrepancy that exists when applying the BNS Control
Test to private emails of Microsoft customers, as opposed to Microsoft’s accounting records, was
not part of the court’s analysis and not a focus of this Note. However, the lack of discussion of this
potentially important distinction illustrates future difficulties companies will face in interpreting
the consequences of the Microsoft Order. The result in this case may be an unwarranted extension
of the BNS doctrine. Id. This was the first time the BNS doctrine had been applied to a warrant.
Id. The question still remains how far the BNS doctrine of “control” reaches.
103. Transcript of July 31 Order, supra note 11, at 69–70.
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Congress did intend the statute to apply extraterritorially if need be.104 The
court recognized the presumption against extraterritorial application of
domestic laws unless there existed explicit congressional authorization.105
However, the court held that because Congress was aware of the BNS
cases, which were decided between 1982 and 1984, when it passed the SCA
in 1986, following the canons of statutory construction, it was aware of the
existing case law when it passed the SCA.106 Therefore, if Congress knew
of the existence of the BNS precedent, it would have drafted the statute to
apply to information or documents located outside the United States so that
the statute coincided with the then-contemporary (and recent) legal
precedent of the BNS holding.107
C. EXTRATERRITORIAL “SEARCH AND SEIZURE” UNDER THE SCA
Beyond the issue of “control,” Microsoft also argued it still should not
be forced to disclose their customers’ private e-mails because doing so
would be authorizing an extraterritorial “search and seizure” warrant
without the consent of the Irish government.108 Microsoft contended that
SCA warrants under § 2703 are confined to the borders of the United
States. Specifically, Microsoft was adamant that the disclosure of its
customers’ private e-mails equated to a “search and seizure”, analogous to
that of a government search of the contents of a postal carrier’s customers
package.109 According to Microsoft, the SCA does not explicitly permit
extraterritorial seizures of private e-mails of this nature (or any nature to be
exact).110 In addition, such extraterritorial application of the SCA without
the explicit consent of the Irish government or courts would violate
international law and foreign policy.111
To counter, the U.S. government argued that even though the e-mails
were located on servers in Ireland, since Microsoft could access the e-mails
domestically, there was no actual extraterritorial application of the SCA

104. Keshner, supra note 49.
105. See Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
106. Keshner, supra note 49. See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of

Appellate Decision and the Rules of Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 395 (1950); Levine, supra note 21. Levine finds this interpretation contentious because of
the apparent conflict regarding the reach of the BNS doctrine, including whether the BNS doctrine
applies to warrants, a company’s business records, or also extends to its customers as well. Id.
107. Keshner, supra note 49.
108. Falcone, supra note 58.
109. Id. (“Microsoft analogized to a situation in which the government could subpoena a courier
service to disclose records of where it shipped a customer’s package, ‘but any governmentdirected exploration of a package’s contents would be a search because it would invade the
reasonable expectation that sealed contents will remain private.’ Microsoft’s Reply in Support of
Objections (Docket No. 70), at 4.”).
110. Id.
111. Levine, supra note 21, at 2.
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warrant.112 Instead, due to the previously stated “hybrid” construction of the
SCA warrant under § 2703,113 it was the subpoena, not the warrant, that
required Microsoft to obtain the e-mails from its data servers in Ireland and
bring them to the United States.114 The warrant part of the SCA only came
into action once the e-mails were already within the United States; it
addresses concerns over a private users’ “reasonable expectation of privacy
as to their emails.”115 Therefore, under a subpoena, Microsoft must produce
evidence or information to the court within its “possession, custody, or
control regardless of the location of that information,” including the e-mails
in question.116
Ultimately, the court determined there was no extraterritorial “search
and seizure” under the SCA in this case.117 Instead, the U.S. government
was merely requiring a U.S. company subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, to produce electronic information within its control within
the United States. The fact that the electronic information was located
aboard was coincidental and non-determinative.118 The court referred to
§ 442(1)(a) of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations as dispositive
because it allows courts or agencies in the United States, when “authorized”
by statute or rule of the court, “[to] order a person subject to its jurisdiction
to produce documents, objects or other information relevant to an action or
investigation, even if the information or the person is in possession of the
information outside the United States.”119 Therefore, according to the court,
this “authorization” to order the production of the Microsoft e-mails comes
from the SCA.120

112. Id. See also Falcone, supra note 58 (“In the government’s view, no extraterritoriality issue
is implicated here because the SCA is being applied solely to a US company within US territory.
Per the government, ‘[a]n SCA warrant does not criminalize or regulate any conduct in a foreign
country; it merely compels the provider receiving the warrant to disclose responsive records
within its control to law enforcement agents located in the United State.’ Government’s
Opposition to Microsoft’s Objections (Docket No. 60), at 18.”).
113. The SCA “hybrid” procedure noted previously in Magistrate Judge Francis’s order. In re
Warrant I Mag. J., supra note 5, at 471.
114. Levine, supra note 21.
115. Levine, supra note 21 (referencing potential Fourth Amendment conflicts resulting from
the disclosure of third party private communications by an ISP to the U.S. government).
116. In re Warrant I Mag. J., supra note 5, at 472.
117. As the court concluded, “this was not extraterritorial application of United States law[,]”
but instead, “[the] intrusion on the foreign sovereign” was “incidental at best.” Transcript of July
31 Order, supra note 11, at 69.
118. Id. (“The result of that finding is that the production of that information is not an intrusion
on the foreign sovereign. It is incidental at best.”).
119. Keshner, supra note 49 (emphasis added). See also Transcript of July 31 Order, supra note
11, at 69 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 422(1)(a)).
120. Levine notes that although the court does not explicitly say that this “authorization” comes
from the SCA, it can be assumed that the court was referring to the SCA when quoting the
relevant Restatement (Third) section. Levine, supra note 21.

2015]

Warrants in the Clouds: The Stored Communications Act

677

D. MLAT TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Microsoft argued that extraterritorial application of the SCA violated
international law and foreign policy.121 Specifically, it was referring to the
fact that the United States was bypassing the traditional international
procedure for exchange of documents and evidence between foreign
nations. Microsoft argued that the proper avenue for the U.S. government to
retrieve evidence located in Ireland is through the appropriate Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty (MLAT)122 or through some sort of mutual cooperation
between the U.S. and Irish governments.123
Traditionally, MLATs provide for the cooperation between signatory
nations in criminal matters and proceedings, including the exchange of
evidence and information during a criminal investigation.124 For the purpose
of this case, the United States and Ireland signed an agreement in which
they agreed to provide mutual assistance in criminal proceedings and
investigations, including the production of “documents, records, and articles
of evidence;”125 and the execution of requested “searches and seizures.”126
When, for example, the U.S. government wants to ask for the production of
evidence located in Ireland that the United States cannot otherwise reach
through existing legislation, the United States could put forth a request for
the desired information or evidence to the Irish government.127 In this
request, the U.S. government shall describe the evidence, subject matter and
nature of the investigation, and purpose for which the evidence is sought.128
The request then goes through the Irish government, and if the request is
accepted, it is processed under Irish law.129 This means Ireland has the
authority to issue orders deemed necessary to execute the request, either by
subpoena, search warrant, or any other necessary order.130 Additionally, if
Ireland feels the execution of the request would interfere with Irish criminal
investigations, or similar legal proceedings, Ireland has the right to
postpone or alter the execution subject to its conditions.131
121.
122.
123.
124.

Falcone, supra note 58.
See generally U.S.-Ire. MLAT, supra note 20.
Falcone, supra note 58.
In re Request from United Kingdom to Treaty Between Gov’t of United States & Gov’t of
United Kingdom on Mut. Assistance in Criminal Matters in the Matter of Dolours Price, 685 F.3d
1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Moloney v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1796 (2013) (“The
United States has entered into a number of mutual legal assistance treaties (‘MLATs’) which
typically provide for bilateral, mutual assistance in the gathering of legal evidence for use by the
requesting state in criminal investigations and proceedings.”).
125. U.S.-Ire. MLAT, supra note 20, art. 1(2)(b).
126. Id. art. 1(2)(f).
127. Id. art. 4.
128. Id.
129. Id. art. 5. See also id. art. 14 (regarding “Requests for Seizures”).
130. U.S.-Ire. MLAT, supra note 20, art. 5.
131. Id. art. 5(4).
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Microsoft contends that extraterritorial application of the SCA allows
the United States to bypass its MLAT obligation to Ireland and to obtain emails without going through the proper request channels.132 According to
Microsoft, the United States avoided asking for permission to obtain emails held within Irish borders altogether and instead, demanded Microsoft
to produce the e-mails without Irish consent.133 In response, the U.S.
government claimed that nowhere is there a law that mandates the U.S.
government to obtain evidence located in foreign nations through the
MLAT process when other legal measures exist to appropriately obtain that
evidence.134 More importantly, the U.S. government argued that the MLAT
process was, if anything, an impractical method of obtaining the pertinent
evidence in the ongoing investigation.135
Ultimately, the court affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s opinion that it
made little sense to require the U.S. government go through the U.S.-Irish
MLAT process.136 Chief Judge Preska agreed with Magistrate Judge Francis
that in drafting the SCA, Congress likely did not intend the U.S.
government go through the time consuming and inefficient MLAT process
to obtain overseas documents and information located on domestic ISPs.137
The court found reliance on MLAT process alone was not necessary, as the
process is excessively dependent on mutual cooperation between nations
who could have varying political and judicial agendas, which runs counter
to the time sensitive nature of ongoing criminal investigations.138
E. AN OUTLOOK TOWARDS THE SECOND CIRCUIT APPEAL
After the district court rejected Microsoft’s challenge to the SCA
warrant, Microsoft stated it would not fully comply with the warrant until at
132. Editorial, Adapting Old Laws to New Technologies: Must Microsoft Turn Over Emails on
Irish Servers?, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/28/opinion/MustMicrosoft-Turn-Over-Emails-on-Irish-Servers.html?_r=0.
133. Falcone, supra note 58. See also Government’s Brief In Support of the Magistrate Judge’s
Decision to Uphold a Warrant Ordering Microsoft to Disclose Records Within Its Custody and
Control at 21–22, In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., No. 13-MJ-2814, 2014 WL 4629624 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2014) [hereinafter Brief
for Government] (“There is nothing in international law that requires the Government to use a
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (‘MLAT’) to obtain evidence (particularly from a U.S. provider)
located in a foreign country when other lawful means of obtaining the evidence are available. Nor
do the specific MLATs the United States has signed with Ireland and the European Union contain
any such requirement.”).
134. The U.S. government uses the phrase “other lawful means of obtaining the evidence,”
referring to lawfully using the SCA to acquire the private e-mails in question as opposed to the
U.S.-Ire. MLAT. Brief for Government, supra note 133, at 21–22.
135. The U.S. government reiterated its argument previously made before Magistrate Judge
Francis in the initial proceeding against requiring the use of the U.S.-Ire. MLAT. In re Warrant I
Mag. J., supra note 5, at 474–75.
136. See Keshner, supra note 49.
137. See id.
138. Id.
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least appellate review had occurred.139 Microsoft agreed to be held in
contempt for its non-compliance with the court-ordered SCA warrant in
order to appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit without
delay.140 Microsoft made clear its intent to appeal as soon as possible.141
Both parties have filed briefs with the Court of Appeals.142
IV. MICROSOFT’S COMPLIANCE PROBLEMS AS
CONSEQUENCE OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF THE SCA
The district court’s approval of the SCA warrant has significant
implications on Microsoft and other major U.S. Technology Companies
going forward.143 Microsoft’s compliance with the SCA warrant may
satisfy U.S. law, but may simultaneously violate the laws of a foreign
nation, such as Ireland. This places Microsoft, and other U.S. Technology
Companies, in the precarious situation of trying to determine which laws
reign supreme. Additionally, the SCA warrant imposes the privacy laws of
the United States on a foreign citizen in a foreign country, particularly
egregious if the Microsoft user whose email account is under investigation
is not a U.S. citizen. The SCA warrant throws the jurisdictional reach over
electronic information into disarray and makes it difficult for U.S.
Technology Companies to construct compliance policies.
As a result, this Part examines various challenges Microsoft and other
U.S. Technology Companies face to set their privacy and business policies
in response to the extraterritorial application of the SCA warrant. In
139. Michael Lipkin, Microsoft Admits Contempt, Sets Up Appeal On Email Warrant, LAW360
(Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/575248/microsoft-admits-contempt-sets-upappeal-on-email-warrant.
140. The two parties (the United States government and Microsoft) disagreed regarding the
correct “path” to appeal and are hotly contesting it now. See Zach Wittaker & Larry Seltzer,
Microsoft Refuses to Comply After Judge Revives Overseas Data Search Warrant, ZDNET (Aug.
31,
2014),
http://www.zdnet.com/article/microsoft-refuses-to-comply-after-judge-revivesoverseas-data-search-warrant/. Procedurally, Microsoft had to admit to contempt so the order was
final and subject to appellate review. See Rory Carroll, Judge May Hold Microsoft in Contempt
After Refusal to Hand Over Foreign Data, THE GUARDIAN (Sep. 3, 2014, 3:08 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/sep/03/microsoft-contempty-court-judge-datadispute. Ultimately, Microsoft agreed to be held in contempt instead of appealing the contempt
order so that it could appeal the actual SCA warrant order without delay. See Lipkin, supra note
139; Bob Van Voris, Microsoft Agrees to Contempt to Speed E-Mail Case Appeal, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-08/microsoft-agrees-tocontempt-to-speed-e-mail-case-appeal.html.
141. See Van Voris, supra note 140.
142. See generally Brief for Appellant, In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account
Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985 (2d Cir. 2015), available at
http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Microsoft-Opening-Brief-120820141.pdf. See
also generally Brief for the United States of America, In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail
Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985 (2d Cir. 2015), available at
http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/GOVT-BRIEF.pdf.
143. See Levine, supra note 21.
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particular, this Part looks at the Irish, and more broadly E.U., reaction to the
SCA warrant and the economic implications on U.S. Technology
Companies therefrom.
A. IRELAND’S REACTION TO THE SCA WARRANT IN ITS BACKYARD
The district court’s approval of the Magistrate Judge’s extraterritorial
SCA warrant has stirred debate in Ireland over the legitimacy of U.S.
procedural power to obtain evidence beyond its jurisdiction.144 The Irish
government has expressed concern over the United States’ motion to
directly obtain e-mails located on servers in Dublin, Ireland.145 Over the
years, Ireland has made itself an attractive site for U.S. Technology
Companies to place their European headquarters.146 Many of the United
States’ top technology companies, including Microsoft, have used Ireland
as a location to host substantial data “server farms” (also known as data
centers)147 for their respective global data storage networks.148 The fact that
Ireland is commonly used as a station for data centers only heightens the
tension between the United States and Irish government over the
application of the SCA.
In response to the Microsoft warrant, Ireland’s Prime minister of data
protection, Dara Murphy, made clear that he found the United States’
extraterritorial reach “objectionable,” noting that the proper avenue to
obtain the e-mails was through the established U.S.-Irish MLAT.149 Murphy
stated that Ireland was open to complying with the United States’ request
for the e-mails.150 However, since the United States decided to bypass the
bilateral agreement established by the U.S.-Irish MLAT,151 questions of
exactly who owns the Microsoft e-mail contents have arisen, including

144. See Ireland Voices ‘Serious Concern’ over U.S. Order on Microsoft Emails, U.K.
REUTERS (Sept. 4, 2014, 1:05 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/09/04/uk-usa-microsoftemails-ireland-idUKKBN0GZ1CE20140904.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. A “server farm” is defined as “a group of servers in one location connected by a network.”
Steven R. Swanson, Google Sets Sail: Ocean-Based Server Farms and International Law, 43
CONN. L. REV. 709, 714 (2011). With the expansion of cloud technology, global “server farms”
have expanded in popularity among U.S. tech companies. This allows users, including individual
customers and companies at large, to store what was once local computer data on “remotelylocated computer servers” around the world. Id.
148. Tech companies such as Microsoft and Google. See REUTERS, supra note 144; Henry
McDonald, Ireland is Cool for Google as Its Data Servers Like the Weather, THE GUARDIAN
(Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/dec/23/ireland-cool-google-dataservers-weather.
149. See REUTERS, supra note 144.
150. See id.
151. Although the U.S. government has argued that the U.S.-Ire. MLAT is not a mandatory
procedural process. Brief For Government, supra note 133, at 21–22.
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whether these e-mails are under the jurisdiction of the Irish government.152
In addition, the question of ordering Microsoft to produce e-mails located
on servers in Ireland violates Irish law.153 The U.S. government contended
that Microsoft failed to state any international law that would be violated by
the SCA warrant’s order to produce the relevant e-mails.154 Furthermore,
the crux of the U.S. government’s argument was that not only will there be
no violation of international law, but in fact the SCA warrant “does not
involve an attempt to exercise control over foreign territory,”155 and
therefore, Microsoft’s practical and jurisdictional limitation arguments are
void. Although the U.S. government’s argument has merit, there are
obvious extraterritorial implications this ruling has on Ireland, Microsoft,
and beyond.156
In Ireland, the Irish Data Protection Acts of 1988 and 2003 oversees the
regulatory protection of data that is processed or controlled within
Ireland.157 These acts prohibit the transfer of personal data from Ireland to
outside the “European Economic Area” unless adequate protections to
personal privacy are made by the recipient nation.158 The acts contain
certain exceptions for the allowance of the transfer of personal data outside
of the European Area for reasons of “‘legal obligation’ or ‘necessary for the
administration of justice.’”159 Such provisions could legitimize the SCA’s
extraterritorial application in Ireland and its adherence to Irish law.160
Although many legal experts and ex-lawmakers161 have openly denounced
152. Jennifer C. Archie & Ulrich Wuermeling, Microsoft Stands Up in Court for European
Privacy
Rights?,
LEXOLOGY
(Sept.
8,
2014),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0f15ad1b-cd22-4f3b-929b-43e5cdcead6a.
153. Id.
154. Brief For Government, supra note 133, at 21–22.
155. Id. at 20. Backing for this statement comes from the SCA’s “hybrid” part subpoena /part
warrant construction, along with the fact that the evidence requested is electronic and therefore
can be acquired and viewed domestically, with no need for federal agents to seize the e-mails
abroad. See In re Warrant I Mag. J., supra note 5, at 475–77.
156. O’Connor, supra note 24.
157. Id. (“The Irish Data Protection Acts 1988 and 2003 seek to regulate the collection,
processing, use and disclosure of data relating to individuals that is processed or controlled in
Ireland.”).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. In contrast, Michael McDowell, a former Irish Attorney General and now pre-eminent
barrister before the Irish Supreme Court, has argued that such exceptions are “only lawful where
such disclosure is required or mandated by reference to Irish law and is subject to the jurisdiction
and control of the Irish courts.” Id. (emphasis in original).
161. Michael McDowell stated that “MLAT was the appropriate procedural forum for the
transfer to take place.” Id. Dara Murphy, the Irish Minister of State at the Department of the
Taoiseach and Foreign Affairs with Special Responsibility for European Affairs and Data
Protection, claimed that “compliance with the warrant may result in Microsoft, and any other U.S.
companies with operations in the E.U. which are served with such warrants in the future, being in
breach of the Acts and the EU Data Protection Directive, stating that ‘this would create significant
legal uncertainty for Irish and EU consumers and companies regarding the protection of their
data which, in this digital age, is everyone’s most valuable asset.’” Id. (emphasis in original).
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the United States’ infringement on Irish soil, it is unlikely that “Irish
privacy law will be decisive in the Microsoft case,”162 at least as it pertains
to the upcoming appeal.
Although the United States’ disregard of Irish law may not be decisive
in determining the issuance of the SCA warrant, Ireland’s reaction has
economic and policy implications on Microsoft in its global compliance.163
If Microsoft has to produce the evidence for the U.S. government, others
will question Ireland’s ability to protect customer’s data (both foreign and
domestic) from government intrusion. In addition, the order could inhibit
Microsoft’s expanding cloud computing global network.164 Ireland has
already filed an amicus brief in support of Microsoft over this order.165 Irish
customers would be tempted to avoid using Microsoft and other U.S.
Technology Companies to store their information to avoid U.S. government
intrusion in their data.166 It is unclear what Microsoft could do to its
business models and privacy policies to give Irish customers clear
assurances when their private electronic data and information will or will
not be subject to existing U.S. privacy legislation.167
B. ON A BROADER SCALE: TENSIONS RISE BETWEEN THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES
The district court’s decision to uphold the SCA warrant raises tensions
between the United States and foreign nations, in particular those within the
E.U., when it comes to the U.S. surveillance of international data security
and privacy protections.168 The NSA WikiLeaks/Snowden scandal is only
but a recent memory, especially for those of the E.U.169 The E.U. is still
hesitant of the United States’ unrefined and mostly undefined Internet
privacy policies after the NSA’s “sweeping surveillance was legalized when
162.
163.
164.
165.

Archie & Wuermeling, supra note 152.
See generally O’Connor, supra note 24.
See id.
Mark Scott, Ireland Lends Support to Microsoft in Email Privacy Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
24, 2014, 5:44 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/24/ireland-lends-support-to-microsoftin-email-privacy-case/?_r=1. In its brief, Ireland states it would be pleased to expeditiously
consider a request for the private e-mails should the United States make one through the U.S.-Ire.
MLAT. Brief of Ireland, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 4, In re Warrant to Search a
Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Operated by Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-cv (2d Cir.
2015).
166. O’Connor, supra note 24.
167. The existing U.S. legislation being the SCA and the vague framework the court had to
work with in applying the dated statute to the realities of modern technology and global data
networks. See generally Kattan, supra note 4.
168. Falcone, supra note 58 (“In allowing the magistrate judge’s ruling to stand, the federal
district court may have inadvertently heightened tensions between the US government and privacy
advocates, and raised even more challenges for US service providers as they seek to negotiate a
path between compliance with US law and the privacy demands of both their customers and
authorities outside the US, particularly in Europe.”).
169. See Levs & Shoichet, supra note 19.
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Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act.”170 After documents were
revealed that exposed the NSA’s surveillance was not only of suspected
terrorists, but of communications between Americans and roughly thirtyfive world leaders,171 the N.S.A’s “PRISM Programme continues to haunt
the principles of data protection across Europe.”172 Therefore, the district
court’s approval of the SCA warrant only increases the E.U.’s skepticism of
U.S. data privacy laws and heightens their fear of privacy violations by the
United States.
Certain E.U. nations have taken, or have threatened to take, significant
action in response to the district court’s ruling.173 For example, the German
government has already publically stated that it will refuse to use any U.S.
company for data storage unless the Microsoft warrant is overturned.174
Germany could be the first of many countries to shy from using U.S. data
companies for data storage to avoid privacy risks as a consequence of the
SCA’s extraterritorial reach.175 For Microsoft, this would be increasingly
problematic both for their international cloud network and business
outlook.176 Microsoft stands to lose an entire nation’s worth of revenue that
cannot easily be replaced. More importantly, such a loss would enable
foreign competitors to gain stronger positions in the cloud industry, as
foreign customers elect to use non-U.S. Technology Companies to store
their wealth of electronic information due to U.S. privacy concerns. It
remains unclear whether there is anything Microsoft could do on its own to
repair its business relationship with Germany and other E.U. nations from a
privacy policy perspective as the law currently stands.177 The Managing
Director of Microsoft Germany has been busy at work trying to come up
with solutions should the warrant be upheld on appeal.178 However, no
solution would completely alleviate the United States’ ability to request

170. Elizabeth Atkins, Spying on Americans: At What Point Does the NSA’s Collection and
Searching of Metadata Violate the Fourth Amendment?, 10 WASH. J.L. TECH & ARTS 51, 55
(2014).
171. See James Ball, NSA Monitored Calls of 35 World Leaders After US Official Handed Over
Contacts, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsasurveillance-world-leaders-calls.
172. O’Connor, supra note 24.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. At this point, it would not be surprising if such an international reaction occurred since it
seems unlikely for the order to be overturned by the Second Circuit under the existing legal
framework and legislation. It would then only be upon Congressional amendment to the SCA that
the United States could assuage European nations to do business with U.S. technology companies
for data storage, because these companies would be unable to promise data security abroad. See
Levine, supra note 21.
176. See O’Connor, supra note 24.
177. See id.
178. See id.
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data stored on Microsoft servers in Germany, unless the data was
completely separated from the United States.179
Beyond Germany, other European nations, including Ireland, have
formally requested that the European Commission examine whether the
SCA warrant violates any E.U. data protection laws.180 U.S. Technology
Companies have also pushed the E.U. to investigate whether the district
court’s ruling has violated E.U. data privacy laws as well. The amount of
legal uncertainty the extraterritorial application of the SCA creates is
alarming both to foreign nations and domestic technology companies
alike.181 The fact that neither the E.U. Commission nor U.S. companies
know if E.U. data protection laws have been violated only highlights the
inherent difficulty in finding an international solution should the SCA
warrant be approved on appeal.
Currently, it is not yet clear if the district court’s order and magistrate
judge’s warrant under the SCA forces Microsoft to violate any E.U. privacy
laws.182 Microsoft has previously argued before both the magistrate judge
and district court judge that the proper channel to obtain the e-mails was
through the bilateral U.S.-Irish MLAT.183 However, as previously noted,
this is a flawed argument as the U.S.-Irish MLAT is neither mandatory nor
persuasive.184 Looking at the E.U.’s data protection laws directly does not

179. Managing Director of Microsoft Germany, Dr. Christian Illek, has stated that Microsoft is
considering the possibility of working with partners to develop a cloud data centre
based in Germany, with the aim of alleviating national concerns over cyber security.
According to Dr. Illek, Microsoft is testing the idea of a ‘German cloud system’, where
data could be hosted by a partner company (rather than a Microsoft Group company)
but not be subject to US law.
Id. This is similar to the ideas of “cloud localization,” a concept China and Russia have begun to
establish. See Allison Grande, Apple’s China Data Storage Portends Localization Movement,
LAW360 (Aug. 22, 2014, 5:52 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/569841/apple-s-china-datastorage-portends-localization-movement.
180. See Jennifer Baker, Call the Commish! Ireland Dragged into Microsoft Dispute Over
Alleged
Drug
Traffic
Data,
THE
REGISTER
(Nov.
19,
2014),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/11/19/call_the_commish_ireland_dragged_into_alleged_drug_t
raffickers_microsoft_data_dispute/.
181. Mary Minihan, Microsoft Data Case May Have ‘Very Serious’ Implications—Minister,
IRISH TIMES (Sept. 3, 2014, 6:02 PM), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/microsoft-datacase-may-have-very-serious-implications-minister-1.1916834 (statement of Irish Minister of State
for Data Protection Dara Murphy) (“This would create significant legal uncertainty for Irish and
EU consumers and companies regarding the protection of their data which, in this digital age, is
everyone’s most valuable asset.”).
182. See Baker, supra note 180.
183. See generally In re Warrant I Mag. J., supra note 5; Transcript of July 31 Order, supra
note 11; In re Warrant II C.J., supra note 11.
184. In re Warrant I Mag. J., supra note 5, at 374–75 (“Moreover, nations that enter into
MLATs nevertheless generally retain the discretion to decline a request for assistance.”). See also
Brief for Government, supra note 133, at 21–22 (“There is nothing in international law that
requires the Government to use a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (‘MLAT’) to obtain evidence
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help much either. In 1995 the European Community (EC) “attempted to
harmonize data protection laws in order to secure approval from EC
member states through the EC Data Protection Directive.”185 Initially, EC
member states that had “historically high data protection standards,” were
hesitant to approve the legislation.186 In response, the EC Data Protection
Directive included a general ban on processing and transferring personal
data outside the European Economic Area (EEA), unless a limited number
of exceptions applied.187 Therefore, before the E.U. could transfer personal
data outside the EEA, the recipient nation must have established
“adequately protective privacy laws.”188
U.S. privacy laws do not pass this criterion.189 However, data transfer
between the U.S. and E.U. was still necessary, and therefore the two agreed
to establish the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles190 to allow U.S. companies a
method to certify compliance with E.U. privacy standards to enable the
transfer.191 Microsoft is certified under Safe Harbor Principles to transfer
personal data between the E.U.192 In addition, Microsoft’s terms of use for
its e-mail platform, Outlook.com, “explicitly reserve[s] the right to provide
user data in order to satisfy applicable law, regulation, legal process or
governmental requests.”193 To add to the confusion, some have claimed that
the private e-mails, should they be produced and transferred under the SCA
warrant, would not be transferred under Safe Harbor Principles.194
Therefore, further investigation is necessary to determine Microsoft’s
liability through compliance with the SCA warrant.
Most importantly, Microsoft and other U.S. Technology Companies are
in the near impossible situation of sifting through vague domestic and
international legislation in the attempt to create a definitive and clear
privacy policy to calm frustrated customers and avoid violating either
(particularly from a U.S. provider) located in a foreign country when other lawful means of
obtaining the evidence are available.”).
185. Lothar Determann & Robert Sprague, Intrusive Monitoring: Employee Privacy
Expectations Are Reasonable in Europe, Destroyed in the United States, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
979, 1023 (2011) (citing Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML).
186. Id. at 1024.
187. Id. at 1024 n.233 (“The European Economic Area (EEA) is comprised of the twenty-seven
EU member states, plus three more—Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway—which agreed under a
separate treaty to adopt certain EU laws. See Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA),
1994
O.J.
(L
1)
3
(May
2,
1992),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?
step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=1.”).
188. Kesan et al., supra note 4, at 419.
189. Id.
190. Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32000D0520&from=en.
191. Kesan, et al., supra note 4, at 420.
192. Archie & Wuermeling, supra note 152.
193. Id.
194. O’Connor, supra note 24.
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foreign or domestic law.195 U.S. technology and cloud providers would
“need to promptly review their business models and engage with data
protection regulators, at least to the extent they host data, including personal
data, in the EEA on behalf of third parties . . . .”196
However, what makes this alteration to U.S. Technology Companies’
business models even more difficult is the fact that the SCA’s approval is
based on the vague and overly expansive BNS doctrine.197 The district
court’s ruling “creates significant risk for any company subject to U.S.
jurisdiction by weakening its ability to protect its customers’ information,
abolishing distinctions between a company’s own business records and its
customers’ private correspondence, and subjecting companies to potential
sanctions for violating privacy laws of the countries in which they locate
their data centers.”198 The BNS doctrine simply does not afford enough
clarity to the present case to allow data storage companies, such as
Microsoft, to make the proper adjustments to their policies to allow them to
sufficiently comply both domestically and internationally.199 It is important,
however, to note that this problem does not lie with the court’s ruling and
interpretation of the law. Rather, the problem stems from the out-of-date
SCA, which courts are now forced to stretch to apply to the modern
advancements of global cloud network technology.200
It is therefore the recommendation of this Note to update the SCA to
reflect the globalized reality of today’s data sharing capabilities.201 The
district court’s interpretation of the SCA in In re Warrant is the most recent
example of the statutes ineffectiveness in promoting consistent and
comprehensible application and compliance. The problem lies in Congress,
not the courts. Congress needs to decide whether it wants to treat electronic
evidence in the same fashion as traditional physical evidence. If electronic
evidence were treated similarly, physical location of the data server would
determine the nation having jurisdiction over that information. Therefore,
evidence physically held in foreign nations would be beyond the reach of
U.S. warrants and would require the cooperation of foreign authorities. U.S.
Technology Companies would surely prefer this method of procedure.
However, the inefficiencies mentioned by the U.S. government of MLATs
and the need to strike a balance between privacy and public safety make
this an unlikely solution. Instead, amending the MLAT process to create a
more streamlined system of processing cross-border electronic evidence
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
Id.
See Levine, supra note 21.
Id.
Id.
See Kattan, supra note 4, at 617.
Kesan et al., supra note 4, at 401 (“The status of the SCA is problematic because much of
the language is very unclear or outdated and interpretations of the statute by courts have varied
significantly.”).
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requests that still respects the distinguishable privacy rights of separate
nations would be a good bridge-gap for the SCA. This would allow
Congress some time to contemplate and effectuate a more significant
overhaul of the legislation overseeing electronic information in the near
future.
V. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ON MICROSOFT AND THE
REST OF THE U.S. DATA SERVICE INDUSTRY
The district court’s approval of the SCA warrant not only creates
compliance problems on a legislative level for Microsoft, but also creates
very real economic implications for Microsoft’s expansion as a business
and the evolution of the cloud industry as a whole.202 Cloud technology has
erupted over the past few years and has been the new focal point for data
storage global strategies for technology companies.203 Cloud technology
promotes a global network of shared data that is transferrable beyond
borders.204 This inherent transferability and expansive structure that
permeates through cloud technology is exactly what makes the industry so
profitable and important for the future of the technology industry.205 Studies
have shown “digital trade has increased the U.S. GDP by 3.4 to 4.8 percent
and created up to 2.4 million jobs.”206 A McKinsey Report also estimated
that “improved use of data generates as much as $5 trillion in additional
economic value each year in seven industries alone.”207
In particular, the “transatlantic data flows” between the United States
and E.U. have become increasingly important for the progress of national
economies and the prominent U.S. Technology Companies that supply both
the United States and E.U. with data networks. Microsoft is one of the
202. See O’Connor, supra note 24 (“The ramifications of this decision for technology
companies threatens the growth of the global cloud model . . . .”); Denys Emmert, DOJ Overreach
Could Kill The Digital Economy, THE DAILY CALLER (Oct. 23, 2014, 1:23 PM),
http://dailycaller.com/2014/10/23/doj-overreach-could-kill-the-digital-economy/.
203. Robinson, supra note 1, at 1199.
204. See generally K. Senathipathi, et al., A Cross Border Access to Data Stored In the Cloud, 2
INT’L J. OF ADVANCED RES. IN COMPUTER ENGINEERING & TECHNOLOGY 2707 (2013). See also
Robinson, supra note 1, at 1203 (“This [cloud storage] business model is expanding rapidly as
users and providers realize its benefits . . . . The liability of the technology and its growing
acceptance by consumers and service providers offer powerful evidence that a lasting
technological and societal shift is underway.”).
205. See Joshua Meltzer, The Importance of the Internet and Transatlantic Data Flows for U.S.
and EU Trade and Investment (Brookings, Working Paper 79, 2014), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2014/10/internet%20transatlantic%20d
ata%20flows%20meltzer/internet%20transatlantic%20data%20flows%20version%202.pdf.
206. Id. at 1.
207. Emmert, supra note 202 (citing JAMES MANYIKA ET. AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST.,
OPEN DATA: UNLOCKING INNOVATION AND PERFORMANCE WITH LIQUID INFORMATION (2013),
available
at
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/open_data_unlocking_innovation_and_p
erformance_with_liquid_information).
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preeminent U.S. Technology Companies.208 U.S. Technology Companies
are at the forefront of the global market and their growth depends on the
ease of electronic information transfer between data servers around the
world without jurisdictional hindrance.209 E-mails, like the ones in
contention in the In re Warrant case,210 are stored as part of these cloud
computing services, which topped business expenditures for over $174
billion dollars in 2014 and is expected to increase exponentially in the
upcoming years.211 Therefore, Microsoft and other U.S. Technology
Companies have much to lose financially from “foreign retaliation” against
the extraterritorial application of the SCA.212
As previously noted, U.S. Technology Companies are still reeling from
the backlashes of the NSA privacy scandal.213 Edward Snowden, a previous
NSA employee, released information that the NSA had been collecting
mass electronic surveillance data from companies like Microsoft, Apple,
Google, and Facebook to spy on foreign governments.214 If foreign nations
view U.S. Technology Companies as unofficial extensions of the U.S.
government, U.S. companies risk huge losses in business from overseas
customers.215 Foreign customers neither want to be associated with a
government known for extensive privacy violations, nor subject to invasive
U.S. privacy laws simply by being a customer of a U.S. corporation.
Germany has been outright with its discontent with American data
companies and has already refused to use Microsoft or any other U.S. data
company for its data services, unless the SCA warrant is overturned.216
China has expressed its intention to begin a data localization movement, in

208. See Meltzer, supra note 205. See also Cloud Solutions, MICROSOFT PARTNER NETWORK,
https://mspartner.microsoft.com/en/us/Pages/Solutions/microsoft-cloud-solutions.aspx (last visited
Feb. 28, 2015) (stating experts expect Microsoft public IT cloud services industry to reach over
$107 billion by 2017); Motley Fool, supra note 13 (“Microsoft is betting its future on the cloud.
Its [sic] cloud computing platform, Azure, is expected to become the backbone of Windows 10.”).
209. Steve Pociask, DOJ’s 2-Million-Jobs Mistake, THE HILL (Sept. 30, 2014, 10:00 AM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/219033-dojs-2-million-job-mistake.
210. See In re Warrant I Mag. J., supra note 5.
211. Pociask, supra note 22, at 4 (citing data from the U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis, as of September 4, 2014).
212. Pociask, supra note 209.
213. Matt Day, Microsoft’s Rivals Become Its Allies in Overseas Email Warrant Case, SEATTLE
TIMES
(Dec.
13,
2014),
http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2025232338_microsoftirishserverxml.html?syndi
cation=rss (“Facing skeptical customers at home and abroad in the wake of Edward Snowden’s
disclosures about the extent of the government’s reach into the Internet, Microsoft, and peers such
as Google and Facebook, have taken the opportunity to speak up.”).
214. Motley Fool, supra note 13.
215. Id.
216. See O’Connor, supra note 24 (“The German Government has stated it will not store data
with US cloud providers unless the decision is overturned.”). See also Motley Fool, supra note 13
(“In June, the German government replaced Verizon with Deutsche Telekom, citing surveillance
concerns presumably related to the Angela Merkel phone-hacking scandal.”).
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which it would only rely on data servers physically located in China.217
Neither of these reactions is particularly surprising considering the
continued skepticism of U.S. foreign surveillance policies, and it is entirely
possible that this international backlash will continue.
For companies like Microsoft, who “generate a substantial portion of
their revenue overseas,” and rely on the cloud for the future success of their
tech business, the foreign backlash against the extraterritorial application of
the SCA is a financial nightmare.218 The extraterritorial application of the
SCA is seen as a U.S. invasion of personal privacy abroad.219 If foreign
nations are purposefully avoiding using American companies such as
Microsoft, it will directly inhibit Microsoft’s cloud data network expansion.
In addition to Microsoft losing customers worldwide, investors are going to
be more skeptical about the company’s future in dealing with these
increasing compliance issues and customer losses, and may be less likely to
invest in Microsoft’s future on the open market.220 This amount of
uncertainty, as a result of extraterritorial application of the SCA, frightens
U.S. Technology Companies about their economic future. 221
VI. FUTURE LEGISLATION AND CONSIDERATIONS –
INTRODUCTION OF THE LEADS ACT TO SENATE
In reaction to the extraterritorial application of the SCA in In Re
Warrant of a Certain E-mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corporation,222 several members of Congress have already
introduced a new bill to the Senate floor to quell domestic and international
reactions to the warrant and to begin the process of amending the SCA.223
The new bill, entitled the LEADS Act,224 looks to “preclude the use of U.S.
warrants to obtain communications content stored outside the [United
States] unless the content is in the account of an American.”225 Therefore, in
order for the United States to be able to force Microsoft to disclose private
e-mails located on servers abroad through the use of a judicial warrant, the
customer or user of those e-mails must be a U.S. citizen.226 The goal of this
217.
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Act is to help deal with the foreign reaction to the SCA warrant and soften
fears of foreign citizens of being subject to U.S. privacy invasion.
As previously discussed, a clear indication of Congress’s extraterritorial
intent is worriedly missing from SCA itself.227 The language of the SCA is
vague at best, and its legislative history does not give insight as to whether
Congress intended the SCA warrant to apply so broadly when it was first
drafted in 1986. The LEADS Act seeks to clarify Congress’s intention of
the extraterritorial application of the SCA and to limit the judicial warrant’s
international scope and reach. The courts should not be forced to interpret
the SCA as it is currently written with as much discretion as they are forced
to use since the statute is dated and presently insufficient. The reactions
from U.S. Technology Companies and nations abroad from the current SCA
warrant interpretation shows that clarification and limitations on the United
States’ extraterritorial warrant powers on electronic data is necessary going
forward.228 Whether the LEADS Act clarifies the SCA enough or whether it
will be passed by the Senate and ratified at all remains to be seen.
In addition, the LEADS Act seeks to improve the MLAT process. The
U.S. government’s decision to seek an SCA warrant for the e-mails in
Ireland, as opposed to following MLAT procedure for production, was
largely based on the MLAT’s inefficiencies, especially in matters of high
security.229 The LEADS Act would “require the Department of Justice to
create an online intake form through which foreign governments could
request mutual legal assistance, and it would permit the DOJ to give
preference to requests made on-line.”230 The LEADS Act seeks to
modernize the MLAT process so that countries can more easily obtain
evidence abroad through their respective treaties.231 However, such
computerization of the MLAT requires money, and this is subject to the
politics of obtaining sufficient federal funding.
In theory, modernizing the MLAT process would be incredibly
beneficial to the United States. Ideally, the United States should be utilizing
the MLAT to seek assistance in obtaining evidence located in foreign
nations which are parties to such treaties. . This pertains to electronic
evidence, including e-mails, as well. The MLAT approach is currently the
“best way to accommodate the interests of two governments when one
country seeks data stored in another country.”232 By making an MLAT
request, the United States is being open about its intentions to obtain
electronic information stored abroad. With today’s technology and the ease
of transferring and storing electronic information throughout the world, this
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

In re Warrant I Mag. J., supra note 5, at 472.
See Nojeim, supra note 225.
See In re Warrant I Mag. J., supra note 5, at 473.
Nojeim, supra note 225.
See The LEADS Act, supra note 26, § 4 (“Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Reforms”).
Id.

2015]

Warrants in the Clouds: The Stored Communications Act

691

formal request, although time-consuming, respects a nation’s boundaries
and ensures private personal information is obtained with consent.
At the same time, there is merit to the U.S. government’s argument that
the current MLAT process is slow and subject to political objectives that
may not conform to time sensitive investigations of international matters of
concern.233 It is evident Microsoft and Ireland denounce the U.S.
government’s alleged bypass of the U.S.-Irish MLAT.234 Although the U.S.Irish MLAT’s purpose is “to improve the effectiveness of the law
enforcement authorities of both countries in the investigation, prosecution,
and prevention of crime through cooperation and mutual legal assistance in
criminal matters,”235 and, traditionally, is the process by which the U.S.
government would obtain evidence located in Ireland through a domestic
warrant, the U.S. government’s arguments for efficiency in relation to
criminal investigation has legitimate backing in today’s post-9/11 era.
Criminal investigations on high security matters, such as drug enforcement
or terrorism, need to run smoothly and efficiently because time of the
essence. There is no reason to bog down investigations where critical
evidence is located abroad and risk losing valuable intelligence due to
another nation’s potential political goals that may be in opposition with the
ongoing U.S. investigation in sending the evidence in a timely manner.
Additionally, the current extraterritorial application of the SCA warrant
does not allow the U.S. government to obtain electronic information from
anyone for any reason. There are constitutional measures in place, in
particular the Fourth Amendment that requires the U.S. government to
show before a judge probable cause for issuing the SCA warrant. To
establish probable cause, the U.S. government must establish the individual
in question is suspected of illegal activity and that obtaining the e-mails
located abroad is vital to the ongoing investigation.236 The extraterritorial
application of the SCA would not unduly expand the power of the U.S.
government to freely obtain any electronic information from anybody it so
chooses. However, there are serious problems with allowing the U.S.
government to bypass the MLAT process altogether. Instead, the U.S.
government has chosen to take an expansive interpretation of a dated statute
to allow the U.S. government to obtain electronic evidence without the
consent or even request of the foreign nation where the electronic evidence
is stored.237 It was able to do this because the SCA is so vague to begin with
and therefore can be construed widely. The courts had little choice but to
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uphold the extraterritorial application of the SCA warrant based on current
legislation.
Improving the MLAT process under the LEADS Act is a great start to
establishing a procedure for the United States to obtain electronic evidence
stored abroad. It allows the already established legal channels for
exchanging evidence between nations to proceed as intended, while also
accounting for the problems that nations, such as the United States, now
face when investigating and prosecuting criminal matters due to the
ubiquitous presence of electronic information. It remains to be seen if such
an online MLAT database can be created. More importantly, the bill itself is
the foundation for a global conversation about how to deal with the transfer
of electronic data stored around the world for criminal investigations.238
Customers of U.S. Technology Companies seek certain assurances of the
privacy of their information that they store on cloud servers. In turn, U.S.
Technology Companies must be able to provide customers with reasonable
expectations of their privacy rights. In addition, U.S. Technology
Companies need clear and precise compliance standards so as not to violate
domestic and international law. All of these factors conflict with the
uncertainty created by the extraterritorial application of the current SCA.239
The global discussion must continue in order to help find the balance
between the needs of the U.S. government’s ability to efficiency investigate
criminal matters in conjunction with U.S. Technology Companies needs of
continued financial success and privacy protections.
CONCLUSION
This Note concludes that extraterritorial application of the SCA is too
vague and inconclusive for U.S. Technology Companies to properly
construct legitimate privacy policies for their customers and thereby
threatens their economic growth. Congress must amend the SCA to not only
clarify Congress’s intentions for extraterritorial application of the SCA
warrant, but also to make sure there are safeguards against excessive
international application of the SCA warrant so that foreign law is not
violated or disturbed through cross-border criminal procedure. The
extraterritorial application of the SCA warrant places U.S. Technology
Companies that rely on worldwide cloud storage networks, such as
Microsoft, in danger of losing huge sums of business due to an ambiguous
and dated statute.240 In addition, the extraterritorial interpretation of the
SCA further strains the United States’ international relations with foreign
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nations, especially those in the E.U., when it comes to data protection and
privacy rights.
The introduction of the LEADS Act into the Senate floor is a start to
clarifying and narrowing the scope of the SCA.241 However, the LEADS
Act is only the beginning of what is a long process of overhauling data
privacy statutes written during the Internet’s mainstream conception in the
Regan-Era. Beyond making congressional statutes more relevant to modern
times, however, the U.S. government must also assist U.S. Technology
Companies by updating its own cross-border processes as well. The U.S.
government should take advantage of the technological advances available
in order to improve the efficiency of the international exchange of online
information and evidence for criminal proceedings. The world will only
continue to become more and more globally dependent. Issues of crossborder conflict over the exchange of online information will be a
continuously heated issue of contention unless steps are taken now to catch
up to the realities of the global infrastructure of electronic information.
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